→ if lambda > 0: if I increase x by alpha% then I need to increase B by more than alpha% to keep Z (HIGH CROWDING, high rivalry → can be privatised without government intervention) → if lambda = 0: if I increase x by alpha% then I need to increase B by alpha% to keep Z constant. Substract something from your costs to be equal at the toll revenues) If lambda = negative: then the toll revenue will NOT be enough to cover the costs (because you → it is not common to build the road with toll revenues but it can be sufficient enough to build the Two equations (see green lines) and two unknowns (x and B). x * (dZ/dB) = delta (delta is known) : SAMUELSON RULE
#PECUNIA BETEKENIS DRIVER#
→ when you increase B with 8% and increase x (number of drivers) with 8%, there will not be aįor the social cost-benefit: benefit = cost of driver + additional cost of driver on other If you increase X ceteris paribus, Z will go up. If you increase B ceteris paribus, Z will go down. SO if more and more people come the efficience difference Production efficiency among several producers of G (Public Good) requires MCa=MCb To get a pareto optimum you need excludability, for excludability you need rivalry.
2 Public goods and external effects page 47 E’ = MR (MO) - Harberger triangle : the economic value you lose due to monopolies. : Rent seeking: finding the rent is burning resources. Zonder dit zou men niet met elkaar kunnen omgaan (Hobbes, 1651). Overheidsingrijpen Kan alleen als er eigendomsrechten zijn. Participants in a command economy have an incentive to misrepresent Participants on competitive markets have an incentive to reveal Measures: Pigovian tax, health care subsidies Violations: pollution during production, vaccination Measures: clear legal framework, quality controls Violations: monopolies, oligopolies, entry & exit barriersĪssumption 2: Complete Markets (no transaction costs & symmetric information) Optimal production structure: MRS = MRTįirst Welfare Theorem: Under certain assumptions, competitive equilibrium is Pareto efficient.Īssumption 1: No market power (agents are price takers) Optimal allocation of production factors.ģ. Optimal allocation of consumption: MRS identical across individualsĢ. Labor productivity, in response to rising salaries in other jobs that have experienced higher laborġ.
Its position, less government involvement.īaumol’s cost desease: the rise of salaries in jobs that have experienced no or low increase of Public choice view: “Leviathan” governments grow at the expense of taxpayers. Based on production: Toegevoegde waarde, added valueīenevolent view: Economic development requires more and more government services Based on expenditure: GDP= C + G + I + NXĢ. Public choice economist: meer politieke agendaġ. Stabilization: voorkomen van grote fluctuaties (steeds minder groot aandeel) Distribution: eerlijk verdelen van goederen/geldģ. Allocation: correcting market failluresĢ. Volgens musgrave zijn er 3takens voor de overheid ġ. Normatieve analyse: er zit een mening in en beschrijft de effecten Email: analyse explain something zonder te zeggen of hetgoed of slechtt is